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This article gives a comparative description of three different
general structural pension reform models applied in 12 Latin American
countries, analysing their key concepts. In its main part, it analyses and
suggests policies to deal with the 11 challenges that must be faced in
such reforms: the decline in labour force coverage; the growing failure to
pay contributions; the faults due to imperfect competition among pension
fund management companies; the continuing high level of administrative
costs; the accumulation of capital, yet without solid evidence that this
has had a positive impact on national saving; the high and prolonged
fiscal cost of the transition; the potential development of the capital market
but a lack of diversification in the investment portfolio; the variable real
returns on investment; the lack of evidence that pensions are higher
under the private than under the public system; the accentuation of
gender-based inequities, and the erosion of solidarity.
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  This article is an updated summary of part of the author’s
monograph entitled Las reformas de pensiones en América Latina
y su impacto en los principios de la seguridad social (Mesa-Lago,
2004a), and was presented at the Seminar “Lecciones y desafíos de
23 años de reformas estructurales en América Latina”, Santiago, Chile,
22-23 April 2004, which was organized by the ILO, the Ministry of
Labour and Social Security of Chile, and Fundación Chile 21.
In mid-2004 there were 12 Latin American countries
which had carried out or approved structural reforms of
social security pensions whereby the former “public”
systems were totally or partially “privatized”. Such
reforms have already been operating for 23 years in
Chile and between 6 and 12 years in six other countries.
There is no other region in the world, including Central
and Eastern Europe, which has witnessed changes of
such scope and depth (Müller, 2002). The Latin
American reforms have not only influenced similar
processes in various other countries, but have also been
reflected in the agendas of international and regional
financial organizations such as the World Bank and the
IDB, as well as posing challenges for international and
regional bodies specializing in social security, such as
the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the
International Social Security Association (ISSA), the
Inter-American Conference on Social Security (CISS),
and the Ibero-American Social Security Organization
(OISS). A recent book noted in this respect: “Never in the
history of social security has so much been changed in
so little time” (Madrid, 2003, p. 13).
First of all, this article gives a brief comparative
description of the three different general models
applied in the region, together with the diverse features
of the reforms in the 12 countries, according to the
legislation in force. Using the statistics available for
nine countries and sometimes for all 12, the central part
of the article analyses and suggests policies that could
be used to deal with the 11 challenges that the reforms
must face: the level of labour force coverage; the degree
of compliance in the payment of contributions; the faults
due to imperfect competition among the management
companies; management costs; the accumulation of
capital and its impact on national saving; the fiscal cost
of the transition; the development of the capital market
and the degree of diversification of the investment
portfolio; the real returns on investment; the level of
pensions; gender-based inequities, and solidarity.
Generally speaking, the countries have adjusted the
reforms to their financial, economic, social, political and
social security conditions. Some, however, have
mechanically copied a presumed universal model which
cannot work due to the lack of some essential elements.
Countries which have not yet committed themselves to
a particular reform process should carefully study the
experience of the 12 countries which have made
structural reforms in this respect (with all their successes
and failures) before deciding whether to make structural
or parametric reforms and, if they decide on the former,
before seeking to apply a generic model they should
adapt it to their own conditions.
II
The key concepts involved, and a general
description of the reforms
1. Public and private pension systems
Public and private social security pension systems are
defined in this study in the light of their four fundamental
elements: contributions, benefits, system of financing,
and form of management. The public system is
characterized by: undefined contributions, defined
benefits, an unfunded (pay-as-you-go) or partial
collective capitalization (PCC) system of financing, and
public management. In contrast, the private system is
characterized by defined contributions, undefined benefits,
a full individual capitalization (FIC) system of financing,
and private management, although this can also be of
other types: private, public or mixed (Mesa-Lago, 2004b).
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2. Structural and non-structural reforms
Structural reforms completely transform the public
system, replacing it wholly or partially with a private
one. Non-structural or parametric reforms seek to
strengthen the public system financially in the long
term by raising the age of retirement or the level of
contributions, applying stricter calculation formulas, or
other measures.1
The 12 structural pension system reforms in Latin
America follow three different models: substitutive,
parallel or mixed systems. The first part of table 1
shows the countries applying each of these models, the
date when the new system came into operation, and its
four basic characteristics. The second part of that table
shows the countries that still have public systems and
their four basic characteristics.
The substitutive model has been applied in six
countries: Chile (which pioneered this approach, in
1981), Bolivia and Mexico (1997), El Salvador (1998),
the Dominican Republic (implemented gradually
between 2003 and 2006) and Nicaragua (where its
initiation was postponed in 2004). In this model, the
public system is closed down (no new affiliates are
allowed) and replaced by a private system; its four
basic characteristics are those already mentioned,
except in Mexico, where its management is multiple,
and the benefits may be defined or undefined.2 Of 22
TABLE 1
Latin America: Models and characteristics of pension reforms, 2004
Model, country and date of initiation System Contributions Benefits System of financing Management
of reform
Structural reforms
Substitutive model Private Defined Undefined Full individual Privatea
   Chile: May 1981 capitalization
   Bolivia: May 1997
   Mexico: September 1997
   El Salvador: May 1998
   Dominican Republic: 2003-06
   Nicaragua: 2004
Parallel model
   Peru: June 1993 Public or Undefined Defined Unfundedb Public
   Colombia: April 1994 Private Defined Undefined Full. indiv. capitaliz. Privatea
Mixed model
   Argentina: July 1994 Public and Undefined Defined Unfundedb Public
   Uruguay: April 1996 Private Defined Undefined Full. indiv. capitaliz. Multiple
   Costa Rica: May 2001
   Ecuador: 2004
Parametric reforms or unreformed
   Brazilc Public Undefined Definedd Unfunded or collective Public
   Cuba partial capitalization
   Guatemala
   Haiti
   Honduras
   Panama
   Paraguay
   Venezuelac
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of the legislation of the 12 countries.
a Multiple in Mexico, the Dominican Republic and Colombia.
b In Peru, Argentina and Uruguay, but collective individual capitalization in Colombia and Costa Rica.
c Parametric reforms recently introduced or under way.
d Defined contribution in part of the private sector programme in Brazil (notional accounts).
1
 For more on reform policies, see Madrid (2003) and Mesa-Lago
and Müller (2004).
2
 In Mexico, all those who were insured when the reform was enacted
have the right, when they retire, to choose the best pension between
that offered by the public system of defined benefits (now closed)
and that offered by the private system, based on individual accounts.
This concession has given rise to serious uncertainty about the fiscal
cost of the transition, and was being debated in 2004.
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countries which have carried out structural reforms of
the pension system, only one outside Latin America has
introduced a substitutive system (Mesa-Lago and
Hohnerlein, 2002).
The parallel model has been applied in two
countries: Peru (1993) and Colombia (1994). In this
model, the public system is not closed down, but is
reformed (completely in Colombia and only partially
in Peru), a new private system is established, and the
two systems compete with each other. The public
system has its four typical characteristics, except than
in Colombia the system of financing is partial
collective capitalization instead of an unfunded system.
The private system also has its four typical
characteristics, except that in Colombia the
management is multiple. No country outside Latin
America has followed this model, possibly because of
its complexity.
The mixed system has been applied in four
countries: Argentina (1994), Uruguay (1996), Costa
Rica (2001) and Ecuador (as of August 2004 it had not
yet come into operation because of an unsettled legal
action against its applicability). This model combines
a public system, which is not closed and provides a
basic pension (first pillar) with a private system which
offers a supplementary pension (second pillar). The
public pillar has its four typical characteristics, as does
the private pillar, except that the management of the
latter is on a multiple basis in all four of the countries.
This is the most widely adopted model outside Latin
America and is applied in at least 12 Western and
Eastern European countries (Mesa-Lago and
Hohnerlein, 2002; Müller, 2002).
The other eight Latin American countries have
kept their public systems, with the characteristics
detailed in table 1. Brazil made parametric reforms in
1998-1999 (including a system of financing based on
notional accounts in the general system for private
workers), and another parametric reform of the system
for public employees is currently in the process of
approval in Congress (Schwarzer, 2004). Venezuela
approved a structural reform (total substitution), but
this was abolished by the present government, which
approved parametric reforms in 2002 (LOSSS, 2002). In
Panama, workers, employers and the government
agreed to carry out a parametric reform with the aid
of the ILO in 1998, but the government whose term of
office ended in 2004 postponed its application,
aggravating the actuarial imbalance and giving rise to
an accounting imbalance for the first time (Mesa-Lago,
2003a). Structural or parametric reforms have been
considered in Guatemala, Honduras and Paraguay.
There has been no public discussion on reform in Cuba
and Haiti, but the first of these countries is considering
a parametric reform, which had not yet been approved
as of March 2004.3
3
 See Mesa-Lago (2003b, 2004a and 2004c).
III
The beneficial effects of structural reforms
Structural reforms have had many beneficial effects,
including:
i) the unification of different systems in a number of
countries (Bolivia, Costa Rica, Chile, El Salvador
and Peru), which strengthens unity and makes
possible portability, although segmentation persists
in other countries (Argentina, Colombia and
Mexico);
ii) equalization of conditions of access and rules for
the calculation of pensions in most of the systems
(except for the armed forces in all countries except
Costa Rica), which has had a positive impact on
equality of treatment;
iii) the introduction in some countries of access
conditions (such as retirement ages) which are
more in keeping with life expectancy at retirement,
thus strengthening long-term financial sustainability;
iv) the establishment of a much closer relation
between contributions and the size of the pension,
as well as opening up the possibility for middle-
and high-income groups to save substantial sums
that could enable them to receive higher pensions;
v) State guarantees for the payment of pensions
currently being paid in all countries, as well as
recognition of the contributions made under the
public system and a minimum pension in the
private system, in most of the countries;
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vi) elimination of the public system’s monopoly
position and the introduction of competition
(although in many countries this is not functioning
properly);
vii) substantial accumulation of capital in the pension
funds (although this must be balanced by the fiscal
cost during the transition);
viii) increased efficiency in key aspects such as
registration, individual accounts, the provision of
periodic information to insured persons, and rapid
processing of pensions;
ix) the possibility introduced in Chile for insured
persons to select an investment fund of their
choice from among various alternatives; and
x) the creation of technical bodies endowed with
relative independence for regulating and
supervising the pension system (although this
aspect varies among the countries).
With respect to the elimination of the public
system’s monopoly position and the introduction of
private actors in pensions management, it may be noted
that the importance taken on by the private sector vis-
à-vis the public sector varies considerably from one
country to another, because of the different reform
models adopted. At the end of 2002, 100% of insured
persons were enrolled in the private system (or the
private component of a mixed system) in Bolivia,
Mexico and Costa Rica; between 91% and 98% in
Chile, El Salvador and Peru; and 80% in Argentina
(table 2, last column). Changing from one system to
another depends not only on the virtues of the private
system but also on other variables:
i) the insured person’s freedom to choose whether
to stay in the public system or move to a private
or mixed system, as well as that person’s age and
income in some countries;
ii) the legal benefits and incentives provided by the
State to encourage change, as well as the publicity
made;
iii) the rate of return of the public system as compared
with the rate of return on investment (returns on
capital) in the private system, and
iv) the length of time the reform has been in effect.
In Bolivia, Costa Rica and Mexico there was no
freedom of choice, as the law obliged all insured
persons to move to the private system. Furthermore,
in the six countries which adopted the substitutive
model, as well as in two of the countries with a mixed
model (Costa Rica4 and Ecuador), new insured persons
entering the labour force are obliged to enroll in the
private system or component. When the reform has
already been in effect for a long time (as in the case
of Chile, where it has been in operation for 23 years),
the obligation to enroll imposed on those entering the
labour market, together with the gradual retirement of
those insured persons who stayed in the public system,
means that a high proportion of affiliates are in the
private system. In El Salvador, Nicaragua and the
Dominican Republic, the younger affiliates of the
pension system, who were in the majority, were
obliged to move to the new system (which largely
explains the enrollment figure of 91% in El Salvador).
In Chile and Peru, there were strong incentives to
make the change, as contributions under the private
system were lower than in the public system;
furthermore, it was laid down that insured persons who
moved to the private system could not return to the
public one. In Argentina, those entering the labour
market are free to choose between the public and mixed
systems, but workers who do not take a decision are
automatically assigned to the mixed system and those
who move from the public to the mixed system cannot
return to the former, so that 80% are in the mixed
system.5 Publicity has also been a crucial factor in the
change, since the private system has promised higher
pensions and lower management costs than those of the
public system, as well as protection against government
interference.6 In contrast with the other seven countries,
the public system in Colombia (parallel model) still has
55% of the total insured population, while that of
Uruguay (mixed model) has 49% (table 2), since the
public sector has been strengthened. In Colombia,
insured persons are free to change from one system to
the other every five years.7 In Uruguay, the government
gave insured persons over 40 a time limit for choosing
between the reformed public system and the mixed
system, and most of them preferred the former;
furthermore, only those with more than a certain level
of income can join the mixed system.
4
 Costa Rica is a unique case, because there the law obliges all
insured persons (both at the time of reform and in the future) to
enroll in the mixed system, so that all of them are in both the public
system (the first and most important pillar) and the private system
(the second pillar, which provides a supplementary pension).
5
 Because of the economic crisis in 2001-2002 and the subsequent
deterioration in the pension fund, a debate is currently under way in
Argentina on whether the mixed system should be retained or whether
those enrolled in it should be able to return to the public system.
6
 See sections 4 and 9 of chapter IV below.
7
 Initially, they were allowed to change every three years, but in
2002 this period was extended to five years, and moreover affiliates
are not allowed to change during the ten years before retirement
(LRP, 2002).
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TABLE 2
Latin America (nine countries): Distribution of affiliates in public and private or
mixed systems, 2002
Model/Country In both systems Public system Private system
(thousands) Thousands % of total Thousands % of total
Substitutive
Chile 6 879  171  2 6 708  98
Bolivia 761  0  0  761 100
Mexico 29 421  0  0  29 421 100
El Salvador 1 087  94  9  993  91
Parallel
Peru 3 134a  140a  4 2 994  96
Colombia 10 460  5 744b  55 4 716  45
Mixed
Argentina 11 316cd 2 210  20 9 106  80
Uruguay 1 216  600de  49  616  51
Costa Ricad,e 1 175  1 175 100  1 175  100
Total 65 468f  1 153 15.2 56 490 84.8
Source: Asociación Internacional de Organismos de Supervisión de Fondos de Pensiones (AIOS, 2002a and 2002b); Administración Nacional
de la Seguridad Social, Argentina (ANSES, 2002); Banco Central de Uruguay (BCU, 2002); Comisión Nacional del Sistema de Ahorro para
el Retiro, Mexico (CONSAR, 2002 y 2003); Superintendencia de Administradoras de Fondos de Jubilaciones y Pensiones, Argentina (SAFJP,
2003a and b); Superintendencia de Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones, Chile (SAFP, 2003a and b); Superintendencia Bancaria de Colombia
(SBC, 2003); Superintendencia de Banca y Seguros, Peru (SBS, 2002); Superintendencia de Pensiones, Costa Rica (SP, 2002a, 2002b and




c Includes the undecided.
d All the insured persons in the second pillar (private system) are also in the first pillar (public system).
e No figures available on the number of affiliates in the public system; the table shows the number of active contributors, but the total
number of insured must be greater.
f Costa Rica is counted only once.
IV
The challenges that structural
reforms must face
Structural reforms have failed to bring about some
important beneficial effects that they were supposed to
generate.8 This section will analyse 11 challenges that
those reforms face, using legal information from the
12 countries studied and statistics from the nine
countries which have already made these reforms.
Policy recommendations for dealing with those
challenges will also be formulated, and issues which
call for further research will be identified.9
1. Decline in labour force coverage
Before the structural reforms, Latin American public
systems could be classified in three groups, according
to the time when the pension system was introduced
8
 There is a worldwide debate on the supposed effects of structural
pension reforms. See Orszag and Stiglitz (2001), Barr (2002) and
Mesa-Lago (2002 and 2004b). 9
 For greater details, see Mesa-Lago (2004a).
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and the degree of coverage of the labour force (Mesa-
Lago and Bertranou, 1998): i) the pioneers, where
coverage ranged from 63% to 81% in 1980 (Uruguay,
Argentina, Chile and Costa Rica);10 ii) the intermediate
countries, where coverage ranged from 26% to 42%
(Mexico, Peru, Colombia and Ecuador), and iii) the
latecomers, where coverage ranged from 12% to 20%
(Bolivia, El Salvador, Nicaragua and the Dominican
Republic). Reformers assert that the private system
offers two types of incentives for affiliation which do
not exist or have deteriorated in the public system:
ownership of an individual account and the principle
of equivalence (a close relation between the
contributions paid and the amount of the pension
received); they also assume that these incentives will
also lead to an increase in labour force coverage.
Table 3 shows the percentage of the labour force
covered by the two systems (public and private),
although it excludes some groups of insured persons
with separate programmes, such as the armed forces
in all countries except Costa Rica, public employees
in some countries (the employees of most of the
provinces of Argentina, for example) and other small
groups. If these groups were included, the percentage
of the labour force covered would increase. In its two
central columns, the table gives two estimates of
coverage in 2002 based on total affiliation, that is to
say, all the workers who have enrolled in the system,
and active contributors (affiliates who paid a
contribution in the last month). It may be noted that
the coverage based on total affiliation is approximately
twice as large as the coverage based on active
contributors.
10
 Costa Rica belongs to the second group in terms of the date of
establishment of its system, but to the first group in terms of labour
force coverage and degree of development of the system.
TABLE 3
Latin America (12 countries): Percentage of labour force covered
by both systems (public and private) before the reform and in 2002,
and sectors difficult to cover, 2000
(Percentages)
Model/Country Coverage before Coverage in 2002 Self-employed Incidence of
the reform: Affiliates  Contributors workersa  povertyb
Contributors and year
Substitutive
Chile 64 (1980) 111 58 15 21
Bolivia 12 (1996) 23 11 46 61
Mexico 37 (1997) 72 30 20 41
El Salvador 26 (1996) 40 19 31 50
Dominican Republic 30 (2000) ... ... 31 30
Nicaragua 16 (2002) ... 16 35 68
Parallel
Peru 31 (1993) 28 11 38 48
Colombia 32 (1993) 59 24 36 55
Mixed
Argentina 50 (1994) 69 24d 18 25
Uruguay 73 (1997) 77e 60e 19 10
Costa Rica 53 (2000) 65f 48f 18 21
Ecuador 21 (2002) ... 21 34 61
Averagec  38 63 27 ... 42
Source: Mesa-Lago (2004a).
a Percentage of the employed urban labour force made up of unskilled low-productivity self-employed workers in 1999-2000.
b Percentage of the total population in 2000; in Ecuador and Uruguay, percentage of the urban population.
c Weighted by the author, using the population with pension coverage; the poverty figure is that estimated by ECLAC for the region as a
whole.
d Excludes part of the active contributors in the public system.
e Public system, year 2000.
f June 2003.
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Among the pioneering countries, Chile has 111%
labour force coverage if the total affiliation is used as
the basis, which shows that this leads to over-
estimation of the coverage; moreover, that figure
excludes a further 26% of the labour force made up of
3% insured under the armed forces programme and
23% of the population estimated as not having any
insurance coverage, so that this would give a total of
137%. If the number of active contributors is used as
the basis, however, labour force coverage in Chile
drops to 58%.
The estimates of coverage based on the number
of active contributors before the reform and the number
in 2002 show that coverage has gone down in all
countries. Thus, the weighted average of coverage in
nine countries decreased from 38% before the reform
to 27% in 2002 (table 3). This comparison over-
estimates the coverage before the reform in most of the
countries, however, because it does not take account
of whether the contributor was active in the last month,
as the 2002 figures do, but is based on longer periods
(Mesa-Lago, 2004e). Nevertheless, two normalized
statistical series for Chile based on the number of active
contributors indicate that coverage diminished from
79% in 1973 to 62% in 1975 and 58% in 2002 (Arenas
de Mesa and Hernández, 2001; SAFP, 2002a; table 3).
A similar series for Argentina shows a decline from
35% in 1994 to 26% in 2002 (Hujo, 2004). A serious
challenge is that coverage goes down to half if only
active contributors are considered, and to one-third in
the case of Argentina, because of the severe crisis in
that country. This means that it is essential to develop
more accurate statistics on coverage than the existing
ones, in order to determine more exactly who is
covered and who is not, as well as the characteristics
of the latter, in order to design mechanisms for
increasing the level of inclusion. The most serious
challenge faced by pension systems, whether public or
private, is how to stop the fall in coverage in the formal
sector and how to extend coverage in the informal
sector. In the last 25 years, Latin America has witnessed
an ongoing increase in informal employment, and this
is getting even worse with the transformation of the
labour market (greater labour flexibility) due to
globalization and growing worldwide competition
(Bertranou, 2001). The informal sector grew from 42%
of Latin American urban employment in 1990 to 47%
in 2001, due to the reduction in formal employment
and the growth in self-employment activity and
employment in micro-enterprises and domestic service
(ILO, 2002b). Independent or self-employed workers,
the main component of the informal sector, are on the
increase in the region, but their insurance coverage is
far below that of dependent (salaried) workers; the
percentage of independent workers in the total labour
force is lower in the countries in the pioneering group
and higher in the intermediate and latecomer groups,
which makes their inclusion even more difficult in the
countries of the latter two groups. Furthermore, the
enrollment of independent workers is voluntary in all
the countries except Argentina and Uruguay.11 A legal
mandate calling for coverage would not necessarily
solve the problem in most of the countries (especially
those in the intermediate and latecomer groups),
because of the high percentage of independent workers,
their unstable employment and low incomes, the lack
of employers’ contributions, and serious obstacles in
the areas of registration, collection of contributions and
compliance. Other groups which it is difficult to
incorporate are peasants and agricultural workers
without a steady employer, domestic servants, workers
without contracts, and unpaid family members.12
The protection of the poor sectors through the
granting of social assistance pensions is another
challenge for the reforms. In 2000, the average
proportion of the total population of the region below
the poverty line was 42% and showed an upward trend.
The State grants social assistance pensions to the
population not covered by social insurance in
Argentina, Costa Rica, Chile and Uruguay, which are
the countries with the broadest coverage and lowest
incidence of poverty (10%-25% of the population) in
the region, as shown in the last column of table 3. But
these pensions are not necessarily guaranteed to all
those who need them, because they are subject to the
fiscal resources available, and there is a waiting list in
most of these countries. As a percentage of the total
population, the number of social assistance pensions
was very small in 2000-2001 (ranging from 0.9% in
Argentina to 2.3% in Chile), but it has been shown that
these pensions have a notable positive impact in the
reduction of poverty and indigence (Bertranou, Solorio
and Van Ginneken, 2002). The 2001-2002 crisis in
Argentina, however, reversed these advances in that
country: in 2002 the Ministry of Labour, Employment
and Social Security estimated that the incidence of
11
 Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador and the Dominican Republic have
laws making it compulsory for independent workers to enroll, but
they have not yet been implemented.
12
 See Mesa-Lago (2004e).
C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 4  •   D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 4
AN APPRAISAL OF A QUARTER-CENTURY OF STRUCTURAL PENSION REFORMS IN LATIN AMERICA • CARMELO MESA-LAGO
65
poverty had risen to 50% of the population and 22%
of pensioners (MTESS, 2003).
The other eight countries do not currently grant
social assistance pensions of the conventional type, and
all of them have a low level of coverage (difficult to
extend) and high levels of poverty (between 30% and
68% of the population). The reform in Bolivia included
the creation of a social assistance programme
(Bonosol) which was to provide one annual flat sum
to Bolivians over 65, to be financed from a collective
capitalization fund fed with the dividends from
privatized enterprises, but that sum was paid only for
a few months in 1997; the programme was then
replaced with Bonovida, which provided one flat sum
at the end of 2000, and finally the Bonosol programme
was reintroduced in 2002 and granted 420,000 benefits
in 2003 (Mesa-Lago, 2004a). The reform laws
approved by Costa Rica in 2000, Ecuador in 2001 and
Colombia in 2002 provide for social assistance
pensions, but as of mid-2004 they had not yet been
implemented or there was no information that effective
protection was being given; in the Dominican
Republic, a “subsidized” non-contributory pension has
been announced for indigents, disabled persons,
unmarried mothers and the destitute unemployed and
was due to be put into effect in 2004 but was not.13
The World Bank is now giving strong support for a
“first pillar” to prevent poverty through an unfunded
public system that supplements but does not distort or
take the place of the private system (Gill, Packard and
Yermo, 2003).
Whatever their type or model, pension reforms
should give priority to the extension of coverage of
independent workers who are difficult to incorporate.
Social security should adapt to processes of change in
the labour market and new ways of incorporating
informal workers should be designed. It is of
fundamental importance to give priority to the
prevention of poverty, for which purpose countries
should study the possibility of granting social
assistance pensions focused on the elderly poor; it has
been estimated that this would cost only a tiny fraction
of the gross domestic product (GDP).
2. The growing level of failure to comply with the
payment of contributions
Most of the structural reforms have eliminated or
reduced the compulsory contributions by employers
and have increased the workers’ contribution. Argentina,
Costa Rica, Ecuador and Mexico have not legally
changed the respective contributions of workers and
employers, but Argentina halved the employers’
contributions, through exemptions and bonuses, and in
2001 it also halved the workers’ contribution, although
this has been increasing again since 2003. Costa Rica
reassigned the existing contributions to other
programmes. Ecuador raised the workers’ contribution
for those earning more than a certain level of income,
and Mexico increased the State contribution based on
the payroll. Chile, Bolivia and Peru eliminated the
employer’s contribution, while six countries increased
the workers’ contributions: Bolivia, Colombia, El
Salvador (almost fivefold), Nicaragua, Peru and the
Dominican Republic. Uruguay slightly reduced the
employer’s contribution and correspondingly raised
that of the worker. Only three countries have increased
the employer’s contribution: Colombia, Nicaragua and
the Dominican Republic. In most of the countries, the
elimination or reduction of the employer’s contribution
has led to an increase in the worker’s contribution and/
or the fiscal cost.14
It is argued that the ownership of individual
accounts and the principle of equivalence in the private
system will also encourage prompt payment of
contributions, since the higher the total amount of
contributions (and the higher the return on the individual
accounts), the greater will be the accumulated fund and
hence the higher the pension.15 On the other hand,
increasing the worker’s contribution could lead to
disincentives for enrollment and compliance with
payments. Table 4, which is based on the percentage of
total affiliates who were active contributors in 1998-2003,
suggests that the disincentives have been stronger than
the incentives in this respect. According to this table,
the lower this percentage, the greater the degree of non-
compliance; with one exception, there has been a
downward trend in the degree of compliance in all the
countries. In 2003, the degree of compliance ranged
from 33% in Argentina (the lowest because of the
13 Workers’ Protection Law, Costa Rica (LPT, 2000); Definitive Social
Security Law, Dominican Republic (LDSS, 2001); Social Security
Law, Ecuador (LSS, 2001) and Pension Reform Law, Colombia
(LRP, 2002).
14
 LPT (2000); Law on the System of Saving for Pensions, in Nica-
ragua (LSAP, 2000); LSD (2001); LSS (2001), and Mesa-Lago (2004a).
15
 For a critical analysis in this aspect, see Uthoff (2002).
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TABLE 4
Latin America (9 countries): Percentage of
total affiliates who are active contributorsa
in the private systems, 1998-2003
Model/Country 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Substitutive
Chile 52,8 53,4 50,9 53,7 51,0 49,1
Bolivia  ...b  ...b  ...b 47,0 46,9 44,5
Mexico 63,4 60,2 57,9 44,7 41,7 40,6
El Salvador 67,2 63,7 55.2 53,2 47,6 45,0
Parallel
Peru 45,6 45,7 41,7 41,2 39,4 39,2
Colombia 51,8 50,7 49,4 48,7 47,6 47,7
Mixed
Argentina 48,9 44,3 39,1 29,0 33,2 33,5
Uruguay 67,4 58,7 53,9 53,2 45,1 52,7
Costa Rica  ...c ...c 74,2
Averaged 57,9 55,5 51,0 43,5 42,1 41,8
Source: AIOS (1999-2003a); for Colombia, SBC (1999-2003).
a Affiliates who have paid contributions in the last month
(December), except in Mexico, where the period considered was
the last two months in 1998-2000; in 2003, the period considered
was the month of June.
b Up to 2001, contributors were considered to be those who had at
least one contribution registered since the beginning of the system.
c The system began in May 2001, and up to 2002 contributors were
considered to be those who had at least one contribution registered
during the last year.
d Average estimated by the author, using the total number of
affiliates and the total number of contributors.
this problem is also faced by the public systems, and is
largely due to the growing proportion of the labour force
transferring from the formal to the informal sector
because of the growing flexibility of labour and the
greater use of subcontracted labour without a contract
on a part-time or other basis. Non-compliance increases
in proportion as affiliates change from formal
employment with insurance coverage to jobs that do not
have such coverage.
There is also evidence that evasion and arrears
(payment delays) by employers have risen to significant
levels in some countries. In Chile, for example,
employers’ arrears of insurance contributions increased
six-fold between 1990 and 2002, amounting in the latter
year to US$ 526 million, or 1% of the total value of the
pension fund, 43% of which was unrecoverable because
of the bankruptcy of the firms involved (Mesa-Lago,
2004a). More effective measures must therefore be taken
to reduce evasion and arrears by employers: the legal
figure of social security offences should be established,
with severe penalties for offenders, there should be
tighter inspection, using electronic means, in order to
detect delinquent employers promptly, and specialized
fast-moving courts should be set up with jurisdiction
over this problem. Costa Rica has the fullest and strictest
legislation on failure to comply with such payments, and
the highest percentage of affiliates who pay their
contributions punctually. Two different forms of
collection are used by the countries: in Argentina, Costa
Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, the Dominican Republic and
Uruguay, collection is centralized, while in Bolivia,
Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Peru it is
carried out by the pension fund management companies;
there does not appear to be a relationship between the
form of collection and the degree of compliance. Finally,
the World Bank notes that once they have earned the
right to a minimum pension, most insured persons stop
contributing because they prefer other alternatives that
are less risky, have a lower cost, and provide greater
liquidity, such as investing in a dwelling, a family
enterprise, life insurance, and the education of the
children (Gill, Packard and Yermo, 2003). If this type
of conduct is indeed observed, ways should be explored
for changing people’s attitude through incentives and
disincentives.
3. Serious flaws due to competition among
pension fund management companies
The whole basis of the private system is competition,
because this does away with the monopoly situation of
crisis) to 74% in Costa Rica (the highest level, but this
could be due to the way the period of contribution was
defined). The weighted average of total affiliates who
were active contributors in the nine countries went
down from 58% to 42% between 1998 and 2003: in
other words, 58% were not active contributors in 2003.
In Chile, the level of fulfillment decreased steadily
from 76% in 1983 to 49% in 2003, and in Argentina
it sank from 73% in 1994 to 33% in 2003 (SAFP, 1983
and 2003; Hujo, 2004).
The foregoing shows that not only have the
reform’s presumed incentives to improve compliance
with payments not worked, but the level of non-
compliance has actually got worse. More research into
the causes of such non-compliance is needed in order
to be able to design suitable remedies, but in any case
pension reforms should carefully weigh the implications
of eliminating or reducing the employer’s contribution
in order to avoid a situation where the financial burden
on the insured persons (or the fiscal cost) increases, with
all its adverse effects. It should be borne in mind that
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the public system and, it is hoped, will promote greater
efficiency, thus giving rise to two beneficial effects:
reduction of the management costs and a better rate of
return on investments. It is assumed that the management
companies will compete for affiliates and that the latter
will have the necessary information and skills to choose
the best companies, i.e., those charging the lowest
commission and offering the highest rates of return,
because this will mean that the insured person’s
individual account and his/her pension will be higher.
There is evidence, however, that competition is not
working, or working imperfectly, in most of the
countries.
Competition depends to a large extent on the size
of the market of insured persons: the more there are
of these, the more pension fund management companies
there will be, and vice versa. Thus, in mid-2003
Mexico had 30 million insured persons and 12
management companies, Chile had 7 million and seven
companies (only six since March 2004), Peru had 3
million and four companies, El Salvador had 1 million
and three companies (in mid 2004 only two were left),
and Bolivia had 809,000 insured persons and two
management companies16 (table 5). Costa Rica,
however, with 1 million insured persons, has nine
management companies, the highest number after
Argentina and Mexico, which have 30 and 9 times as
many insured persons, respectively. This may partly be
due to the fact that Costa Rica, like Colombia and
Uruguay, has a multiple management system rather
than only private companies, and also in Costa Rica
the system has only been operating for a few years.
Historical statistics show that in all the countries the
number of management companies first of all rises and
then falls due to mergers: in Argentina the number of
companies went down from 25 to 12; in Chile from 21
to 7; in Mexico from 17 to 12; in Colombia from 10
to 6; in Peru from 8 to 4; in Uruguay from 6 to 4, and
in El Salvador from 5 to 2.
Countries with a very small number of insured
persons should not automatically copy the systems of
big countries, because there is a serious risk that
competition, which is the essential basis of the private
system, will not work in these conditions. Small
countries will also have to decide whether there should
only be private pension fund management companies,
as in half of the countries, or multiple management
types, as in the other half, because the latter system will
make possible greater access of the administrators to
the market. Another important issue is that of exclusive
dedication, that is to say, that the management
companies can only operate in the management of
pension funds and will have to create their own
nationwide infrastructure (buildings, equipment,
personnel), which is extremely costly. It has therefore
been suggested that countries which have a very small
number of insured persons should consider the
possibility of allowing the management companies to
use the infrastructure of other institutions such as
banks, insurance companies or financial establishments,
subject to the necessary caution and separation of
interests, in order to reduce costs and facilitate greater
competition. This measure was incorporated in the
pension reform of the Dominican Republic, and at the
end of 2002 there were six pension fund management
companies already approved and three more pending,
in spite of the small number of insured persons (Mesa-
Lago, 2004a).
16
 The Bolivian Government initially divided up all the insured
persons between the two companies according to affiliates place of
residence and prohibited them from changing from one company to
the other until 2002; as of mid-2004 a planned third management
company had not yet started operations.
TABLE 5
Latin America (9 countries): Competition
among management companies in the
private system, 2002-2003
Model/Country Affiliates Number of Percentage of
(thousands), management affiliates in the




Chile  6 883  7a  79
Bolivia  809  2  100
Mexico  30 381  12  44
El Salvador  1 034  3b  100
Parallel
Peru  3 100  4  76
Colombia  5 013  6  66
Mixed
Argentina  9 275  12  57
Uruguay  626  4  87
Costa Rica  1 104  9  82
Source: Data on affiliates and number of management companies
were taken from AIOS (2003a) and SBC (2003); concentration of
management companies: BCU (2002), CONSAR (2003), SAFJP (2003),
SAFP (2003), SBC (2003), SBS (2003), SP (2002b and 2003) and SPVS
(2003).
a Went down to six in March 2004.
b One of the management companies went bankrupt in 2004.
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Even in countries which have a considerable
number of management companies, competition may
be affected by excessive concentration. The last
column of table 5 shows the high level of concentration
of insured persons in the three largest management
companies at the end of 2002. It may also be noted that
Mexico has the lowest level of concentration because
the law provided that no management company could
have more than 17% of the total number of insured
persons in the first four years of the reformed system,
and not more than 20% since the end of 2001. It may
be argued that if the three largest companies are the
best, then such concentration is not negative, but a
study on Chile shows that, consistently over time, it is
not the three largest management companies which
charge the lowest commissions and provide the highest
rates of return.
There are three reasons why insured persons
choose these three companies, even though they are not
the best: i) most of those persons do not have the
information or the skill to make a suitable choice; ii)
they are influenced by the publicity campaigns of the
management companies, which usually project an
image of security and solidity, but do not provide
insured persons with simple comparative information
on commissions and rates of return so that they can
identify the best management companies; and iii) many
insured persons are enrolled by sales representatives
or promoters, who receive a commission from the
management company every time they transfer an
affiliate to them and who are therefore interested in
changing affiliates from one company to another
without this necessarily being in the affiliates’ best
interests.
The World Bank has found serious flaws in
pension fund competition: i) the industry is oligopolistic
and has a captive clientele whose contributions are
retained until the insured persons retire; ii) there is a
high and growing degree of concentration which is
already a source of concern and may be even more so
in the future; iii) in order to reduce operating costs, the
restrictions on the number of times per year that an
insured person can change his management company17
have institutionalized what was already a de facto
oligopoly and reveal collusion and the development of
a powerful cartel; iv) the evidence in Latin America
clearly shows that competition among management
companies for relatively small market shares only
generates higher commissions, and v) the pension fund
management industry in the region is anything but a
good example of competition (Gill, Packard and
Yermo, 2003, pp. 43-44, 112, 174 and 176).
In view of this diagnosis, it is essential that the
bodies responsible for supervising the system should
play a more active role in promoting competition in this
market, reducing entry barriers, and encouraging the
formation of new management companies, as well as
strictly regulating the work of promoters and establishing
rules to ensure truthful publicity. The supervisory bodies
and/or associations of management companies should
assign more resources to improving the information
provided so as to make it understandable to affiliates,
publishing lists of management companies in the mass
media, listed according to their levels of commissions
and net rates of return, and educating users so that they
can make an informed rational choice. The possibility
should be studied of reducing concentration by imposing
a percentage ceiling on the affiliate shares of
management companies, as is done in Mexico.
4. High management costs
Competition is supposed to reduce management costs,
but it has already been seen that in many countries
proper competition does not exist. The management
cost has two components (the commission and the
premium), and is usually fixed on the basis of the
insured person’s wage (as a percentage or a flat rate)
or, in some cases, on the basis of the balance in the
individual account or the return on investment. The
commission is paid to the management company for
its management of the individual account, the
investment of the funds, and the handling of the old
age pension, and is paid entirely by the insured person
(except in Colombia, where the employer shares in its
payment). Part of the commission consists of the
premium which is passed on by the management
company to a private insurance company in order to
cover the insured person against death or disability
risks (except in Mexico and Colombia, where this is
done through the public system).
Table 6 shows the management cost (commission
plus premium) as a percentage of the insured person’s
wage, but comparison may be a complex matter, as
there may be different commissions which are difficult
to unify into a single average. The lowest total cost is
17
 In six countries (Bolivia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico, Nica-
ragua and the Dominican Republic) affiliates can only change once
per year, and in three countries (Argentina, Colombia and Uruguay)
they can change twice per year. Chile and Peru are the countries
with the greatest freedom to change.
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in the Dominican Republic (2%), but in addition there
may be a charge of up to 30% on the return on
investment and 0.1% for the supervisory body (LDSS,
2001). The second lowest total cost is in Bolivia
(2.21%), because there is no competition or publicity;
for this reason, the part of the commission which goes
to the management company is only 0.5%, but the
premium of 1.71% is the second highest in the region.
The highest total costs are 3.50% in Colombia (1.92%
of commission and 1.58% of premium); 3.51% in Peru
(2.27% and 1.24%), and 4.14% in Mexico (2.50% and
1.64%). In Costa Rica there is no charge based on the
member’s wage, but there is a commission of between
6% and 10% on the return on the fund’s investments,
so as to provide an incentive for the improvement of
that rate of return. In El Salvador, the management cost
of the public system before the reform (as a percentage
of the worker’s wage) was 0.5%, and this increased to
2.98% in 2003 with the introduction of the private
system (Mesa-Lago, 2004a).
Commissions and premiums have displayed
different tendencies over time. Commissions range from
1.45% to 2.27% (except in Bolivia and the Dominican
Republic), so that they represent the main component,
and while they have fluctuated over time, in most of the
countries they have not shown a downward trend.
Premiums range from 0.67% to 1.27% (except in Bolivia
and Colombia), so that they are the lesser component,
and they have gone down in almost all the countries.
Commissions therefore account for most of the total cost
and are the reason why this has not decreased
significantly, which is one of the biggest challenges
faced by structural reforms in the region. In Chile, the
percentage level of the total cost rose from 2.44% in
1981 to 3.6% in 1984, but declined to 2.26% in 2003,
which is only slightly below the 1981 figure, after 22
years of reform (Acuña and Iglesias, 2001).
The lowest management cost, as a percentage of
the total salary deduction in mid-2003, was 18% in
Bolivia, Chile and Uruguay, while the highest costs
TABLE 6
Latin America (11 countries): Management cost as a
percentage of wages in the private system, 2003
Model/Country Deposit in individual Management Total deduction Management cost (%)
account (commission plus premium)a Deduction Deposit
Substitutive
Chile 10.00 2.26 12.26 18.43 22.60
Bolivia 10.00 2.21 12.21 18.10 22.10
Mexico 6.78 4.14 10.92 37.91 61.06
El Salvador 11.02 2.98 14.00 21.28 27.04
Dominican Republicb 5.00 2.00 7.00 28.57 40.00
Nicaragua 7.50 3.00 10.50 28.57 40.00
Parallel
Peru 8.00 3.51 11.51 30.50 43.88
Colombia 10.00 3.50 d 13.50 d 25.93 35.00
Mixed
Argentina 4.75 2.25 7.00 32.10 47.37
Uruguay 12.19 2.81 15.00 18.73 23.05
Costa Rica 4.50 e ... ... ...
Averagec 8.52 2.87 11.39 26.00 36.21
Source: AIOS (2003a), except for the data on Colombia, which are based on SBC (2003) and on Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic,
which are based on LSD (2001) and LSAP (2000), respectively. Averages calculated by the author.
a The commission is paid to the old-age pension management company, while the premium goes to the insurance company which covers
the disability and death risks (the premium is paid to the public system in Mexico).
b In addition to the cost shown, 30% will be charged on the surplus of the annual return on the investment; the percentage for the individual
account will gradually be increased to 8% over five years, the management cost will not change, the total deduction will increase to 10%,
and the cost over the deduction will be reduced to 20%.
c Unweighted average for ten countries (excluding Costa Rica).
d 0.5% goes to the Minimum Pension Guarantee Fund, the total deduction for that Fund will increase to 1% in 2004, plus 1% more in 2005-
2006 for the individual account, giving a total of 15.5% (this could be increased by a further 1% in 2008 if the economy grows).
e There is no commission on the wages, but a percentage on the gross return on the investment.
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were in Mexico (38%) and Argentina (32%). The non-
weighted average of management costs as a percentage
of total deductions in the 11 countries was 26% in
2003. If the management cost is calculated with respect
to the deposit, however, the average cost rose to
36,21% (last column in table 6). The existing
projections indicate that many insured persons will not
save enough to finance their pensions, and the high
management costs will aggravate this problem; if
management costs were reduced, a larger portion of the
contributions would be deposited in the individual
accounts and could help to finance the pensions and
reduce the fiscal cost of financing minimum pensions
(Uthoff, 2002). Some supporters of structural reform
now admit that the management costs are high and that
competition alone (even if it operated effectively)
would not ensure their reduction.18 Management costs
are concentrated in marketing, publicity, sales
representatives’ commissions,19 frequent changes by
affiliates from one management company to another,
and staff wages.
Fixing the management cost as a percentage of the
payroll does not provide any incentive to reduce that
cost, and only two countries (Bolivia and the Dominican
Republic) have established a low ceiling for it, which
could be a possible alternative and could be adjusted if
it were found that it did not offer sufficient incentives.
Another option would be to fix the cost as a percentage
of the balance in the individual account or the return on
investment; with regard to the latter, the results obtained
in Costa Rica should be carefully studied. At all events,
the supervisory body must ensure that the saving through
the reduction of management costs really is passed on
to affiliates through lower commissions.
5. Accumulation of resources in the pension
fund, yet without sufficient evidence of positive
effects on national saving
It has been claimed that pension reform will promote
a big accumulation of capital in the pension fund and
will increase national saving (World Bank, 1994;
Preamble of the Mexican pension reform law). The first
column of table 7 confirms the first assumption,
although there are notable differences between
countries.
The amount accumulated in the pension fund
varies according to the length of time the system has
been in operation, the number of insured persons, the
size of the economy, the level of wages, and the return
on investments. The Chilean reform has been in effect
for 23 years and has built up the biggest fund. In
Mexico, the reform has only been in effect for 51/2
years, but it has already accumulated the second
biggest fund (88% of the size of the Chilean fund),
because the Mexican economy is the second largest in
Latin America and Mexico has the largest number of
insured persons.20 In Argentina, which is the third
18
 See the reference to Holzmann and Valdés Prieto in Holzmann
and Stiglitz (2001); see also Gill, Packard and Yermo (2003).
19
 In Chile, the proportion spent on this was 26% in 1983 and 28%
in 2000, according to Acuña and Iglesias (2001).
TABLE 7
Latin America (9 countries): Fund
accumulated and gross real return
on the investment, 2003
Model/Country Fund accumulated, June 2003 Average real
Millions of As a % annual rate
dollars of GDPa  of return (%)b
Substitutive
Chile  39 672 60.6 10.30
Bolivia  1 261 17.2  17.10
Mexico  34 963 05.6  10.40c
El Salvador  1 309 09.2  10.86d
Parallel
Peru  4 541 08.2 6.57
Colombia  5 350e 06.2e  7.33
Mixed
Argentina  15 607 15.6 10.45
Uruguay  1 149 01.7  15.00
Costa Rica  218 01.4  7.00
Source: Data on accumulation and accumulation as a percentage of
GDP were taken from AIOS (2003a); in the case of Colombia, they
were estimated by the author on the basis of SBC (2002). Data on
the rate of return were based on BCU (2002), CONSAR (2003), SAFJP
(2003a and 2003b), SAFP (2003), SBC (2002), SBS (2002), SP (2002b
and 2003) and SPVS (2003).
a The percentage of GDP represented by the accumulated fund
depends not only on the amount accumulated but also on the size
of the GDP.
b From the beginning of the system up to the end of 2002.
c CONSAR reports a net rate of return of 7.95%.
d The author has estimated 8.36%, based on the nominal rate of
return and the average annual inflation rate.
e December 2002.
20
 The biggest pension fund built up in Latin America was that of
Brazil in 2003 (US$ 80 billion, or 18% of GDP), even though it is
a voluntary programme providing supplementary pensions. This
large figure is due to two reasons: Brazil is the largest economy in
the region, and both the employer and the employee contribute to
this fund.
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economy of the region, the pension fund in 2001 was
60% of the size of the Chilean fund after only 81/2 years
of operation of the reform, but the crisis reduced it to
only 39% in 2003.
The foregoing figures only take account of the
resources accumulated in the individual accounts, but
not the fiscal cost of the transition (see section 6
below). The World Bank (1994) has maintained that
pension reform will promote national saving, which in
turn will boost economic growth, promote employment,
and eventually make it possible to pay better pensions.
Chile is the only country whose reform has been in
effect long enough to test this assumption, and most
of the studies made in this respect have come to
negative conclusions. Holzmann (1997), in a general
equilibrium econometric exercise, deducted the fiscal
cost of the reform (negative) from the saving in private
pension schemes (positive) and concluded that the
impact of the reform on national saving was negative
in 1981-1988 and that no direct positive impact could
be shown in 1989-1996; he therefore warned the Latin
American countries not to cherish too many hopes that
the reform would increase national saving. Arenas de
Mesa (1999) followed a similar methodology, but using
a partial equilibrium model for 1981-1997, measuring
the factors and the results in annual percentage points
of GDP: the saving deposited in the individual accounts
averaged 2.7% for the period, but the fiscal cost
averaged -5.7%, so that the net result averaged -3%,
that is to say, dissaving. Arenas de Mesa also projected
that in the first five years of the twenty-first century
the situation would change and saving would be
slightly greater than the fiscal cost, so that the net result
would be positive and would continue to grow
thereafter, but as it would probably take 20 years to
offset the negative balance of the previous 20 years,
40 years would be needed for there to be a net positive
impact on national saving. Acuña and Iglesias (2001)
deducted the “transitory deficit on social security
pensions” (but excluding the deficit caused by social
assistance, minimum and armed forces pensions) from
private pension saving, and likewise obtained a net
negative average result (-2.7%) for 1982-1997, which
is somewhat smaller than that calculated by Arenas de
Mesa because the latter included all the fiscal costs of
the reform.
Haindl Rondanelli (1997), in contrast, concluded
that the reform had had a positive impact on national
saving in 1990-1994, but he based his calculations on
the overall tax burden rather than the direct fiscal cost
of the reform; using his own figures, if he had deducted
the average cost of the public system deficit (-4.6%)
from the average private pension saving (3.1%) he
would likewise have obtained a negative result of
–1.5%, even excluding the other fiscal costs of the
reform. Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003), taking into
account only the operating deficit and the recognition
bond (excluding minimum, social assistance and armed
forces pensions), estimate that national saving increased
by 2.3% of GDP in 1981-2001 thanks to the reform.21
Although an increase in national saving would be
desirable and important, it should not be a central
objective of structural reform, since so far there is no
solid empirical evidence to back up this supposed
effect.
6. Substantial and prolonged fiscal cost of the
transition
It is claimed that the fiscal cost of the reform will
gradually decline and will finally be eliminated in the
long term. This cost is difficult to measure and compare
between countries, because of the different components
included and the different methodologies used, but
according to rough estimates, in 2000 this cost (as a
percentage of GDP) was 6% in Chile (after 20 years of
reform), 4.5% in Argentina and Uruguay, 2% in
Bolivia and 1.5% in Colombia; it was not possible to
obtain figures for Mexico and Peru (Mesa-Lago,
2004a). The World Bank has projected a fiscal cost for
Argentina, Bolivia and Colombia in 2040 which is far
above the projections made by those countries before
the reform; for Mexico and Peru, the Bank’s
projections indicate a growing fiscal cost between 2001
and 2040, and only in Uruguay are the Bank’s
projections for 2040 lower than those made by the
country before the reform (Gill, Packard and Yermo,
2003). The policies adopted by the countries to tackle
this fiscal cost have been very different: Chile took
suitable measures, it generated a fiscal surplus before
the reform, and its economic policies have had a good
deal of success in the long term, but Argentina did not
make any provisions for the situation, its projection of
the fiscal cost was only half the actual cost, and its
economic policy caused the crisis of 2001-2002.
There are three components of the fiscal cost
during the transition, and all of them are financed by
the State, with few exceptions: the deficit of the public
system, the recognition bond, and minimum pensions
21
 For other opinions, see Kiefer (2004).
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(table 8). In addition, in some countries the State grants
certain guarantees and social assistance pensions which
further increase the fiscal cost. Since the present
section, which is based on Mesa-Lago (2000), refers
to legal and not statistical aspects, it gives information
on the 12 countries which have adopted pension reforms.
Of the 12 countries considered, Costa Rica is the
only one where the State does not have to pay the
deficit of the public system, because the system of
financing, based on partial collective capitalization, is
capable of financing that deficit. This fiscal burden
varies in line with the implicit pension debt, that is to
say, the present value of long-term obligations, which
includes the payment of currently payable and future
pensions. In unfunded or partial collective capitalization
financing systems there is always an implicit pension
debt, but the reform model adopted may make that debt
explicit, generating an immediate fiscal cost
corresponding to the total debt, or it may postpone all
or part of the debt. In the substitutive model, the public
system is closed completely, and the whole of the
implicit pension debt immediately becomes explicit, so
that pensions currently being paid and those generated
by the few persons who remain in the public system
have to be financed by the State. This is because 100%
of the insured persons (Bolivia and Mexico) or 91%
TABLE 8
Latin America (12 countries): Fiscal cost of the reform in the 12 countries which
have adopted it, 2004
Model/country Financial responsibilities of the State
Covers public Pays recognition bonds Guarantees a
system deficit minimum pension
Substitutive
   Chile Yes Does not have a ceiling, is adjusted to inflation, earns 4% real Yes
annual interest, requires previous contributions
   Bolivia Yes Does have a ceiling, is not clear whether it earns real interest, No
requires  one month of previous contributions
   Mexico No Yes
   El Salvador Does not have a ceiling, is not adjustable to inflation, earns real Yes
interest  equal to the rate of inflation, requires previous contributions
   Nicaragua Does not have a ceiling, is not adjustable to inflation, does not earn Yes
interest, requires one year of previous contributions
   Dominican Republic Does not have a ceiling, is adjustable to inflation, earns 2% real Yes
interest, requires previous contributions
Parallel
   Peru Yes Does have a ceiling, is adjustable to inflation, does not earn No; since 2002 only for
interest, requires 4 years of previous contributions affiliates since 1945
   Colombia Does have a ceiling, is adjustable to inflation, earns 3% real Yes (with
annual interest, requires 3 years of previous contributions  limitations)
Mixed
   Argentina Yes Does not have a ceiling, is adjustable to inflation, requires 30 years of Yes (paid by  the first
previous contributions (is paid by the first pillar (the public system)  pillar (the public system)
   Uruguay Yes No
   Costa Rica No No
   Ecuador Yes No
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of the legislation of the 12 countries.
Fuente: Elaboración del autor sobre la base de la legislación de los 12 países.
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to 98% of them (El Salvador and Chile, respectively)
have moved to the private system and ceased to
contribute to the public system, which is left with
almost all the pensions but no contributors, or very few,
thus generating a deficit. In the parallel model, the
implicit pension debt becomes explicit in the private
system but not in the public one, whose implicit
pension debt is postponed; as the public system still
has insured persons who pay contributions (much more
in Colombia than in Peru), the fiscal cost is reduced,
at least for a time. In the mixed model, the implicit
pension debt becomes partially explicit in the second
pillar (private system) but not in the first pillar (public
system), in which it is postponed.
In 8 of the 12 countries the State has to pay a
recognition bond (or certificate of recognition or
compensatory benefit, or the like), equivalent to the
value of the contributions accumulated in the public
system, to all the insured persons who have transferred
to the private system. Four countries do not give such
bonds: Mexico (because of the choice given to insured
persons when they retire, as already explained) and
Costa Rica, Ecuador and Uruguay (because in a mixed
model the insured persons do not move, but remain in
the first pillar, which pays them a basic pension). In
2002, the bond given in Bolivia was limited; in Peru
it had been given to only half of the insured persons
who changed from one system to the other, and in El
Salvador its calculation and issue were five years behind
(Mesa-Lago, 2004a). No information is available for
Ecuador.
In 10 of the 12 countries the State guarantees a
minimum pension to all affiliates of the private system
whose individual account is insufficient to finance a
pension of that level: the State has to pay the difference.
In order to be eligible for a minimum pension, prior
contributions for a minimum of between 20 and 35
years are required. Bolivia does not guarantee a
minimum pension; Peru has only been granting it since
2002, and even then only to persons who were already
insured before 1945, and El Salvador places considerable
restrictions on eligibility (Mesa-Lago, 2004a).
In four countries (Argentina, Colombia, Chile and
Uruguay) the State offers a further two guarantees: if a
pension fund management company cannot guarantee
the minimum rate of return on the individual account,
the State makes up the difference, and if a management
company or insurance company goes bankrupt, the State
assumes responsibility for the payment of the pensions
in question (in Uruguay, these guarantees are given only
to persons insured in the public management company,
which partly explains why it has 38% of the total
number of insured persons). In the Dominican Republic,
the law makes the State responsible for any fault or non-
fulfillment that occurs in the private system.
In all the countries there is a trade-off over the
fiscal cost. The State tries to reduce this cost, either
by not granting recognition bonds or minimum
pensions, or by granting them, but subject to
restrictions (not providing for readjustment, imposing
a ceiling, or demanding prior contributions, for
example). These cuts have been made in the various
countries after the experience of the Chilean system,
which has been the most generous of all, but has also
been the most costly from the fiscal point of view.
Reducing the fiscal cost adversely affects the welfare
of the insured persons, however, since they do not
receive recognition bonds or minimum pensions, or
else these are subject to restrictions. Chile has the most
generous benefits during the transition, but it also has
the highest fiscal costs, while Bolivia has lower fiscal
costs but also (together with Peru) the most limited
rights for the beneficiaries.
The fiscal cost of the transition under a structural
reform (as well as the implicit pension debt) should be
projected in a professional and careful manner, because
it can last for between 40 and 70 years, depending on
the country’s demographic characteristics and the age
of the pension system. The projections should be
subjected to an external audit and should be made
public so that they can be examined by domestic
experts and international organizations. A basic
condition for the success of a structural reform is fiscal
discipline, especially in the case of governments which
already have a fragile fiscal position. Fiscal discipline
and the generation of a surplus, or at least fiscal
balance, are essential prerequisites if pension reform
is to be sustainable. Reforms must also be made in the
areas of finance, banking and taxation and in the
insurance industry in support of the pension reform,
while it is also necessary to identify the sources for the
financing of the fiscal cost and to design effective
economic policies to meet that cost. In-depth research
is needed on the impact that the fiscal cost of the
structural reform can have on income distribution.
7. While financial markets may be developed,
there may be a lack of diversification in the
investment portfolio
It is claimed that pension reform will help to develop
capital markets, create new financial instruments and
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diversify the investment portfolio of the pension fund
in order to hedge against risks. The study by Holzmann
(1997) on Chile concluded that the pension reform has
indeed helped to make the financial markets more
liquid and mature, and that the empirical evidence
coincides with the assumption that such reform has
contributed to the development of the financial market
and a more diversified portfolio. It warned, however,
that this evidence does not constitute convincing proof
that the pension reform has been the decisive factor in
the development of those markets since the mid-1980s,
because that development may have been due to other
factors unconnected with the reform. The World Bank
also maintains that the markets have been deepened,
due at least in part to the pension reform, but in countries
where there have been parallel macroeconomic
reforms, such as Chile, it is extremely difficult to
isolate the effect of one specific reform (Gill, Packard
and Yermo, 2003). Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003),
in contrast, consider that the contribution of pension
saving flows to the development of the Chilean
financial market has been quite robust and recommend
the most radical possible structural reform to
accentuate that effect.
There is a long-standing debate on whether it is
necessary to have a capital market before a structural
reform or whether this is not an essential prerequisite,
since the reform itself will have a positive effect on
the development of that market. Although this is not
the place to settle that controversy, the fact is that small
countries such as Bolivia, El Salvador, Costa Rica and
Uruguay did not have a capital market before their
reforms, or else it was only very incipient and small,
with few investment instruments, and those of a highly
concentrated nature (El Salvador adopted the law
creating and regulating the capital market shortly
before the reform began). And indeed it is precisely
these countries which have least diversified the
composition of the pension fund investment portfolios.
The percentage distribution of the portfolio by
instruments as of mid-2003 indicates that most of the
countries are still very far from reaching a satisfactory
level of diversification (table 9). In Uruguay, Bolivia,
Argentina, El Salvador, Mexico and Costa Rica,
between 57% and 90% of the portfolio is in public
securities, the vast majority of them debt paper. Only
in Peru and Chile do public securities have a clearly
minority share, while in Colombia the share of these
securities is 49.4%; Chile took 17 years to bring this
proportion down from 46% to 29%, thanks largely to
the actions of the supervisory body. In most countries,
the bulk of the investment is in public securities, and
if these have shown a good rate of return this is only
because the State has paid high interest rates on its debt
TABLE 9
Latin America (9 countries): Distribution of portfolio
by types of financial instrument, 2003
(Percentages)
Model/Country Public Financial Non-financial Shares Mutual and Foreign Others
securities institutions   institutions other funds issuers
Substitutive
Chile  29.1  30.4  7.2  10.9  2.4  19.9  0.2
Bolivia  68.1  10.3  19.0  0.0  0.0  1.2  1.4
Mexico  85.4  3.4  11.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
El Salvador  84.0  12.0  3.6  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.0
Parallel
Peru  13.0  33.2  13.1  31.2  0.8  7.2  1.6
Colombia  49.4  26.6  16.6  2.9  0.0  4.5  0.0
Mixed
Argentina  75.9  3.5  1.3  8.2  1.6  8.3  1.1
Uruguay  57.2  37.1  3.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.3
Costa Rica  89.5  5.1  4.7  0.0  0.7  0.0  0.0
Averagea  57.4  16.2  8.0  7.1  1.3  9.7  0.4
Source: AIOS (2003a), except for Colombia, for which the data were taken from SBC (2003).
a Excluding Colombia.
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paper (as for example in the case of Argentina up to
the end of 2001), but this is costly for the economy,
cannot be kept up in the long term, and is risky.22 This
latter aspect was observed in Argentina in 2002, when
the economic crisis and devaluation of the exchange
rate caused a drastic fall in the value of the pension
fund and an increase in the concentration of the
portfolio in public debt paper. The supervisory body
played an active role in this process, because in the
course of 2001 it cooperated with the government to
persuade management companies to agree to convert
instruments which were expressed in dollars and were
tradeable on international markets into “guaranteed
loans” at a lower interest rate; subsequent decrees made
it obligatory to invest the product of bank certificates
of deposit and cash in debt paper, and in 2002 the
government converted the “guaranteed deposits” into
pesos, so that the subsequent devaluation considerably
reduced the value of the pension funds’ portfolio (ILO,
2002a; Hujo, 2004).
Shares are one of the favourite instruments for
diversifying the portfolio, and if the capital market
indeed develops there will be many shares in which the
pension funds can invest. Only in Argentina, Chile and
Peru, however, is a significant proportion of the
portfolio invested in shares (between 8% and 31%); in
El Salvador and Colombia the proportion is very small
(0.4% and 2.9%, respectively), and in the rest of the
countries it is zero. If there are no suitable possibilities
for investing in the domestic market, an alternative
would be to invest in foreign financial instruments, but
some countries prohibit this, since they consider it
against the national interest. In Chile, 20% of the
portfolio is invested in overseas instruments, the
corresponding figures for Bolivia, Colombia, Peru and
Argentina are between 1% and 8%, and the proportion
is zero in the other countries studied.
Small countries which have no capital markets or
where these markets are only incipient must establish
and consolidate them before undertaking a structural
reform. It is essential to develop a capital market,
regulate it, generate confidence in it, create new local
instruments and allow investment in foreign
instruments, subject to a suitable ceiling. Countries
which plan to invest the pension funds mainly in public
debt paper where there is a danger of default should
not make a structural reform, since the risk for the
private sector would be overwhelming. The pension
fund supervisory body must play an important and
independent role in the task of promoting diversification
of the portfolio, in collaboration with the supervisory
bodies for the capital market (Chile has had a positive
experience and Argentina a negative one in this
respect).
8. The variable net real return on investments
Another assumption of the reform is that it will
generate a high rate of real return on investment. The
statistics support this assumption, although the results
vary between countries and also vary according to the
period used for the calculations. The last column of
table 7 shows the average real annual rates of return
(adjusted for inflation) from the time when the system
began to operate up to the end of 2002: 17% in Bolivia;
15% in Uruguay; 10% in Chile, El Salvador, Argentina
and Mexico; and 7% in Colombia, Costa Rica and
Peru. These are gross rates of return: i.e., they do not
deduct the cost of the commission, so that the net return
will be lower: for example, the rates were 10.4% gross
and 7.95% net in the case of Mexico. In 1981-2000,
the gross rate of return of the pension fund in Chile
averaged 11.9 percentage points less than the Selective
Share Price Index (IPSA) of the Santiago Stock
Exchange and 3.8 points more than the average interest
rate on deposits, but with much greater volatility
(Acuña and Iglesias, 2001). In 1993-2000, the pension
fund in Peru had an average rate of return below that
of bank deposits or Brady Bonds (Gill, Packard and
Yermo, 2003).
The foregoing figures refer to the average for the
whole period since the reform came into effect, but if
we take only the period up to the mid-1990s the
average is much higher, while for the period since 1995
it is much lower, because of the 1995, 1998 and 2001
economic and stock exchange crises. Thus, for
example, the average rate of return in Chile was 13.8%
in 1981-1994, compared with 4.4% in 1995-2002 and
negative average rates of –2.5% in 1995 and –1.1% in
1998 (SAFP, 2002a and 2003). In Argentina, the average
was 19.7% in 1994-1997, compared with 7.2% from
mid-1997 to mid-2001 and negative rates (–13.7%)
from December 2000 to December 2001 (SAFJP, 2003a
and 2003b). These fluctuations in rates of return
involve a serious risk: if the insured person retires at a
peak period in the securities market, his pension will
be good, but the amount accumulated in his individual
22
 In El Salvador, the real rate of return fell from 14% in 1999 to
2.4% in 2002, mainly because of dollarization and a cut in the
interest paid by the State (Mesa-Lago, 2004a).
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account may go down considerably during a crisis,
especially if this is prolonged (as in Argentina in 2001-
2002).
This risk is reduced in mixed models, because
they combine two systems: one with guaranteed
defined benefits and another with undefined benefits,
but more time and research are needed to prove this
point, and in any case it requires suitable diversification
of the portfolio. The measures suggested in the
previous section for the diversification of the portfolio
would serve as the basis for ensuring that the rate of
return of the fund would be less dependent on the
interest rates on public securities, and this would
improve the degree of compensation for risks.
9. There is no proof that pensions in the private
system are higher than in the public system
The reforms have promised that the private system will
pay better pensions than those of the public system, but
it is difficult to verify this important promise because
of the lack of up-to-date statistics which are comparable
between the two systems. Two Chilean experts stated
in a study published late in 2001 that “the latest
information published by the Office of the
Superintendent of Pension Fund Management
Companies (AFPs) is for June 1992”, that is to say, at
that time it was almost ten years out of date. That
information indicated that the average levels of private
pensions as compared with public ones was as follows
in the different categories: 43% higher in old age
pensions, 68% higher in disability pensions, 42%
higher in widows’ pensions, and 9% lower in orphans’
pensions (Acuña and Iglesias, 2001, p. 27). These data
are partly contradicted by the following data23 on the
average level of private pensions (March 2002) as
compared with the average for public pensions
(December 2001): private old age pensions (63% of all
pensions) were 24% lower than public ones; disability
pensions (7% of the total) were 15% higher; survivors’
pensions (28% of the total) were 110% higher, and the
weighted average for all private pensions was only 3%
higher than the corresponding average for public
pensions.
In Argentina, the two statistical publications of the
supervisory body do not include figures on the level
of pensions in the private system. Moreover, projections
indicate that the changes made during the 2001-2002
crisis (including the halving of contributions and the
conversion of financial instruments expressed in dollars
into devalued pesos) will reduce the benefits of an
average pensioner with 30 years of contributions by
65% (ILO, 2002a). In Colombia, public pensions have
a higher rate of return than capital in the private system,
which is one of the reasons why the majority of insured
persons have stayed in the public system (Kleinjans,
2004).
It is too soon to predict whether private pensions
will be higher than public ones in the future, because
the private system is not yet mature: in 2002 it paid
only 20% of total pensions in Chile. It is relatively easy
to determine the replacement rate in the closed public
system, since it is based on defined benefits (in Chile
it was estimated that it was between 61% and 80% in
2000), but it is much more difficult to determine what
that rate will be in the private system, since it depends
on multiple variables: age of entry into employment,
growth rate of wages, density of contributions and rate
of return on the pension fund, for example. Simulations
made in Chile, based on different assumptions for those
variables, display enormous differences in their results
(Bertranou and Arenas de Mesa, 2003). In 1988-2001
the lifetime income received showed considerable
variations from one year to another, due to the different
replacement rates obtained by the different cohorts as
a result of the unstable interest rates prevailing in that
period (Gill, Packard and Yermo, 2003).
In Chile, the beneficiaries receiving the minimum
pension (in both the public and private systems
together) amounted to 43% of the total number of
pensioners in the two systems in the year 2000; the
minimum pension was equivalent on average to 70%
of the minimum wage and 24% of the average wage
in the private system; both percentages had shown a
downward trend between 1990 and 2000. It is
estimated that approximately half of the affiliates of the
private system (35% of the men and 60% of the
women) will receive a minimum pension (Arenas de
Mesa and Hernández, 2001). Surveys made in
Argentina in 2001 indicate that, in the population of
economically active age, 33% of the men and 45% of
the women had little or no hope of fulfilling the
requirements for obtaining a minimum pension
(Bertranou and Arenas de Mesa, 2003). Based on
surveys carried out in the metropolitan areas of
Santiago and Lima in 2000, the World Bank estimates
that in Chile 30% of the male and 50% of the female
affiliates do not comply with the requirements for
23
 Based on statistics for 2001 provided to the author by the National
Institute of Social Security (INP) and data in SAFP (2002a).
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receiving a minimum pension, while in Peru the
corresponding percentages were 30% and 60%, but the
gap against gaining access was greater than in Chile
(Gill, Packard and Yermo, 2003). These percentages
would have been even higher if the surveys had been
on a national scale and included rural and smaller urban
areas.
Historical statistical series should be published
comparing the averages for private and public pensions
broken down by categories. Comparative research is
also needed on the replacement rates in the private and
public systems.
10. Increase in gender-related inequity
Structural reforms and private systems have
accentuated gender-related inequity. There is
information from various countries that shows that
women have smaller social security coverage than men
and that their pensions are smaller due to causes both
outside and within the social security system. The
external causes correspond to labour-related
characteristics of women such as: their lower rate of
labour participation and higher rate of unemployment
than those of men, wage discrimination, their
proportionately greater employment in unskilled work
(domestic service, the informal sector, part-time work
and independent work at home without a contract);
furthermore, such occupations are poorly paid and are
usually not covered by social security. The result is that
women accumulate fewer contributions than men
during their working life and therefore have a lower
density of contributions. On the other hand, the life
expectancy of women is between four and five years
more than that of men, so that the period their pensions
have to cover is longer (Bertranou and Arenas de Mesa,
2003; Mesa-Lago, 2004a).
The causes of the gender-related inequity
stemming from within the social security system are
to be found in both the public and the private systems.
A problem common to both systems is that women
often retire earlier than men: five years earlier, for
example, in five private systems. This, together with
their greater life expectancy at birth, means that women
draw their pensions for between nine and ten years
longer than men, on average. The private systems
accentuate the gender inequity in three ways: i) they
demand a minimum number of contributions in order
to receive the minimum pension (20 years in Chile and
25 years in El Salvador, for example), and most of
them have increased the number of years of
contributions required in order to obtain a pension
(from 15 to 25-30 years in the Dominican Republic,
for example), thus making it even more difficult for
women to obtain pensions; ii) they base the pension
on the contributions made throughout the entire active
working life, instead of only taking into account the
last few years, as the public systems do, which
adversely affects women because their contribution
density is lower than that of men; and iii) they apply
mortality tables which are differentiated by gender in
respect of lifetime incomes and programmed
withdrawals, so that the amount accumulated in the
individual account is divided by the average life
expectancy; consequently, women’s pensions are lower
than those of men, and even more so if they retire
earlier (although there is some degree of compensation
in the case of married women, since the lifetime
income takes into account the life expectancy of the
spouse). It is argued that this form of treatment is
actually fairer, because it avoids cross-subsidies
between the sexes, but it is not fairer when one takes
into account the fact that women pay the whole cost
of raising their children, because Latin American
pension systems do not award any credits for that work
(in Chile, the pre-reform pension legislation granted
women one year for each live child). A positive
measure in the reforms has been the equalization of the
normal retirement age for both sexes in seven of the
countries (Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico,
Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic and Uruguay),
which makes it easier for women to accumulate more
contributions and a larger fund in their individual
accounts, for distribution over a retirement period
which is five years shorter. This does not compensate
for the longer life expectancy of women, however.
The combined effect of the above factors on
differences between the sexes may be seen in the case
of Chile: in 2001-2002, for example, the amount
accumulated in the individual accounts of women was
only between 32% and 46% of that accumulated by
men; the replacement rate of women was between 52%
and 57%, while the rate for men was between 81% and
86%, and the average pension of women retiring at 60
was 60% of that of men, or 87% if they retired at 65
(SAFP, 2002b; Bertranou and Arenas de Mesa, 2003).
According to the World Bank, in all the countries
which have made pension reforms, women continue to
obtain lower rates of return than men (Gill, Packard
and Yermo, 2003, pp. 62-64). In theory, mixed systems
should tend to make up for gender inequity more than
substitutive systems, depending on the relative
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importance of the two pillars, because the first (public)
pillar would reduce such inequity, while the second
(private) pillar would accentuate it. In Costa Rica, the
compensatory effect should be greater than in other
countries, because the pension paid by the first pillar
is the main element and the second pillar is
supplementary to it. The opposite would be the case
in Argentina.
Policies to reduce gender inequities should be
aimed at the root causes of these problems. With regard
to the external causes, measures should be taken to
promote stable and productive employment for women;
to increase investment in women’s training at the
national and the enterprise levels; to ensure social
security coverage in the occupations in which most
women work (domestic service, independent work); to
ensure that the principle of equal pay for equal work
is rigorously applied; to ensure that contributions
continue to be paid during maternity leave or periods
when women are receiving unemployment benefits
(where these exist); to permit shortening of the prenatal
period of maternity leave and a corresponding
extension of the postnatal period, in order to give
women more time to look after their newly-born
children; and to make it obligatory to provide day
nurseries in firms above a certain size or to establish a
public programme to provide these services at reduced
rates through fiscal contributions. With regard to the
causes within the pension system, measures should be
taken to equalize the normal age of retirement in
countries where it is still different for men and women,
raising that age for women gradually over a period of
time when necessary, and to allow early retirement
subject to the payment of a smaller pension calculated
actuarially.
11. Disappearance or erosion of solidarity
In the private system, the principle of solidarity is
replaced by the principle of strict equivalence between
the contributions paid and the pension received, thus
reproducing the inequalities existing in the labour
market and in wages, eliminating inter-generational
income distribution, and transferring the redistributive
function to the State (i.e., outside the pension system)
through the guaranteeing of a minimum pension and
the granting of social assistance pensions.
The reforms have introduced (or in some cases
maintained) redistribution mechanisms which are
mostly of a regressive nature: i) exclusion of insured
persons who are in separate special programmes (the
armed forces in almost all the countries and public
employees in some); these insured persons generally
have middle- or high-level incomes, do not contribute
under the general system, but enjoy generous benefits
and fiscal subsidies; ii) the virtual exclusion in most
countries of independent workers and other groups in
the low-income informal sector, as well as the poor;
iii) accentuation of gender inequalities; iv) elimination
of the employer’s contribution and an increase in that
of the worker; v) a greater proportional reduction in
the tax burden of high-income insured persons, because
of the deferment of tax payments on the contributions
they deposit in their individual accounts; vi) the very
high management costs of the system, which are paid
for entirely by the insured persons and generate profits
for the management companies but reduce the amount
deposited in the individual account and future pension,
affecting in particular low-income affiliates; vii) the
fixed commission charged by some management
companies, which represents a larger proportion of the
contributions of low-income workers than those of
high-income affiliates, thereby disproportionately
reducing the deposit in the individual account and the
size of the pension of low-income workers; viii) the
inter-generational inequalities caused by the subsidy
paid by the older affiliates, who have borne the brunt
of the cost of installing the new system, to the younger
affiliates, who bear a smaller burden, and ix) the fiscal
cost of the transition, which implies a transfer to the
middle- and high-income groups of insured persons
which is financed from national taxes, often levied on
consumption and paid by the whole population,
including those who are not insured; this effect
becomes even worse as coverage goes down. See in
this respect Arenas de Mesa (1999); SAFP (2002b); Gill,
Packard and Yermo (2003); Kiefer (2004), and Mesa-
Lago (2004a).
The elements of solidarity and progressive
redistribution effects claimed for the system are usually
exogenous to it. The minimum pension financed by the
State and financed from national taxes does not
generate redistribution among the affiliates of the
private system, but between taxpayers and insured
persons who do not meet the requirements for receiving
such a pension; a considerable part of the current
insured persons will make use of this guarantee, and
their pensions will not usually be in line with the cost
of living. Social assistance pensions, which are also the
responsibility of the State, are only granted in a third
of the countries that have made structural reforms, and
while they have a progressive effect (reduction of
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poverty) this is not financed by those insured in the
private system but by the whole population. In 1981-
2000, the fiscal cost of the social security system in
Chile averaged 5.7% of annual GDP, of which 5.3% was
to cover the cost of the transition (operating deficit,
recognition bond and minimum pensions) but only
0.4% was for social assistance pensions (Arenas de
Mesa and Benavides, 2003). There are two important
exceptions. In Colombia, insured persons whose wages
are four times the minimum wage pay a contribution
of 1% to the Pension Solidarity Fund (with an additional
contribution of 0.2% to 1%, in proportion as income
rises from 16 to 20 times the minimum wage); the first
1% is designed to extend the coverage of independents
and other groups whose socio-economic situation
prevents them from forming part of the social security
system, while the remaining percentage is intended to
cover social assistance pensions (LRP, 2002). In the
Dominican Republic, employers pay 0.4% of the
payroll into a Minimum Pension Solidarity Fund which
is to finance minimum pensions under the contributory
system (LDSS, 2001). The equalization of access
conditions is positive, but exceptions have been made
for some privileged systems, which do not contribute
under the general system, enjoy generous benefits, and
receive fiscal subsidies; it also leaves out the vast
majority of independent workers and other low-income
groups.
The absence of solidarity can be offset by
integrating the privileged groups into the general
system or eliminating the fiscal subsidies they receive,
using these resources to help to incorporate low-income
workers, to extend the coverage of social assistance
pensions, and to adopt the measures suggested earlier
to reduce gender inequity. Countries could also
introduce a solidary contribution to be paid by high-
income workers and/or employers (as in Colombia or
in the law approved in the Dominican Republic) or a
solidary contribution levied on very high pensions (as
provided for in the law which is in the course of
approval in Brazil); the resources thus collected would
be used to extend the coverage of low-income groups
and social assistance pensions. The flat-rate commission
charged by some pension fund management companies
should be eliminated, and the possibility that the cost
of commissions should be shared with employers (as
in Colombia) should be discussed. The high fiscal costs
of structural reform should be offset by the need for




Acuña, R. and A. Iglesias (2001): Chile’s Pension Reform After 20
Years, Working Paper No. 0129, Washington, D.C., World
Bank, December.
AIOS (Asociación Internacional de Organismos de Supervisión de
Fondos de Pensiones) (1999-2001): Boletín estadístico,
Buenos Aires, December, htpp://www.safp.gov.ar/nocs/
aios.htm.
_______ (2002a): Boletín estadístico, No. 7, Buenos Aires, June,
htpp://www.safjp.gov.ar/DOCs/aios.htm.
_______ (2002b): Boletín estadístico, No. 8, Buenos Aires, December,
htpp://www.safjp.gov.ar/DCCs/aios.htm.
_______ (2003a): Boletín estadístico, No. 9, Buenos Aires, June,
htpp://www.saf p.gov.ar/DOCs/aios.htm.
_______ (2003b): La capitalización individual en los sistemas previsionales
en América Latina, Buenos Aires, December.
ANSES (Administración Nacional de la Seguridad Social) (2002):
Informe de la Seguridad Social, Buenos Aires.
Arenas de Mesa, A. (1999): Efectos fiscales del sistema de pensiones
en Chile: proyección del déficit previsional 1999-2037, paper
presented at the Seminar “Responsabilidades fiscales en el
sistema de pensiones” (Santiago, Chile, ECLAC, 2-3 September
1999), Santiago, Chile, Ministry of Finance (unpublished).
_______ (2000): Cobertura previsional en Chile: lecciones y desafíos
del sistema de pensiones administrado por el sector privado,
“Financiamiento del desarrollo” series, No. 105, Santiago,
Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC), December.
Arenas de Mesa, A. and H. Hernández Sánchez (2001): Análisis,
evolución y propuestas de ampliación de la cobertura del
sistema civil de pensiones en Chile, in F. Bertranou (comp.),
Cobertura previsional en Argentina, Brasil y Chile, Santiago,
Chile, International Labour Organisation (ILO).
Arenas de Mesa, A. and P. Benavides (2003): Protección social en
Chile: financiamiento, cobertura y desempeño 1990-2000,
Santiago, Chile, International Labour Organisation (ILO).
Barr, N. (2002): Reforming pensions: myths, truths, and policy
choices, International Social Security Review, vol. 55, No. 2,
Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, March-June.
BCU (Banco Central de Uruguay) (2002): Memoria trimestral del
régimen de jubilación por ahorro individual obligatorio, No.
26, Montevideo, December.
Bertranou, F. (comp.) (2001): Cobertura previsional en Argentina,
Brasil y Chile, Santiago, Chile, International Labour
Organisation (ILO).
Bertranou, F. and A. Arenas de Mesa (comps.) (2003): Protección
social y género en Argentina, Brasil y Chile, Santiago, Chile,
International Labour Organisation (ILO).
Bertranou, F., C. Solorio and W. van Ginneken (comps.) (2002):
Pensiones no contributivas y asistenciales: Argentina, Brasil,
Chile, Costa Rica y Uruguay, Santiago, Chile, International
Labour Organisation (ILO).
CONSAR (Comisión Nacional del Sistema de Ahorro para el Retiro)
(2002): Boletín informativo SAR, No. 6, Mexico City,
November-December.
C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 4  •   D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 4
AN APPRAISAL OF A QUARTER-CENTURY OF STRUCTURAL PENSION REFORMS IN LATIN AMERICA • CARMELO MESA-LAGO
80
_______ (2003): Boletín informativo SAR, No. 2, Mexico City,
March-April.
Corbo, V. and K. Schmidt-Hebbel (2003): Efectos macroeconómicos
de la reforma de pensiones en Chile, paper presented at the
Seminar “Federación Internacional de Administradoras de
Fondos de Pensiones” (Cancún, 15-16 May 2003).
Gill, I., T. Packard and J. Yermo (2003): Keeping the promise of
old age income security in Latin America: a regional study
of social security reforms, Washington, D.C., World Bank
(preliminary document, the final version introduced changes
that could not be incorporated in this article).
Haindl Rondanelli, E. (1997): Chilean pension fund reform and its
impact on savings, in R. Grosse (comp.), Generating Savings
for Latin American Development, Boulder, Colorado, Lynne
Rienner.
Holzmann, R. (1997): Pension Reform, Financial Market
Development and Economic Growth: Preliminary Evidence
from Chile, Staff Papers, No. 44, Washington, D.C.,
International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Holzmann, R. and J. Stiglitz (comps.) (2001): New Ideas About Old
Age Security: Towards Sustainable Pension Systems in the 21st
Century, Washington, D.C., World Bank.
Hujo, K. (2004): Reforma previsional y crisis económica: el caso
argentino, in K. Hujo, C. Mesa-Lago and M. Nitsch (comps.),
¿Públicos o privados? Los sistemas de pensiones en América
Latina después de dos décadas, Caracas, Nueva Sociedad.
Hujo, K., C. Mesa-Lago and M. Nitsch (comps.) (2004): ¿Públicos
o privados? Los sistemas de pensiones en América Latina
después de dos décadas, Caracas, Nueva Sociedad.
ILO (International Labour Office) (2002a): Diagnóstico institucional
del sistema previsional argentino y pautas para enfrentar la
crisis, Buenos Aires.
_______ (2002b): Panorama laboral, Lima.
Kiefer, M. (2004): Evaluación de los 22 años del sistema privado
de pensiones en Chile, in K. Hujo, C. Mesa-Lago and M.
Nitsch (comps.), ¿Públicos o privados? Los sistemas de
pensiones en América Latina después de dos décadas, Caracas,
Nueva Sociedad.
Kleinjans, K. (2004): La elección de un programa de pensión: la
experiencia de Colombia, in K. Hujo, C. Mesa-Lago and M.
Nitsch (comps.), ¿Públicos o privados? Los sistemas de
pensiones en América Latina después de dos décadas, Caracas,
Nueva Sociedad.
LDSS (Ley Definitiva de Seguridad Social) (2001): Santo Domingo,
24 April.
LOSSS (Ley Orgánica del Sistema de Seguridad Social) (2002):
Caracas, 30 December.
LPT (Ley de Protección del Trabajador) (2000): San José, Imprenta
Nacional.
LRP (Ley de Reforma de Pensiones) (2002): Bogotá, D.C., December.
LSAP (Ley del Sistema de Ahorro para Pensiones) (2000): Managua,
15 March.
LSS (Ley de Seguridad Social) (2001): Quito, 13 November.
Madrid, R. (2003): Retiring the State: The Politics of Pension
Privatization in Latin America and Beyond, Stanford, Stanford
University Press.
Mesa-Lago, C. (2000): Estudio comparativo de los costos fiscales
en la transición de ocho reformas de pensiones en América
Latina, “Financiamiento del desarrollo” series, No. 93, LC/
L.1344-P, Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), March. United Nations
publication, Sales No. S.00.II.G.29.
_______ (2002): Myth and reality of pension reform: the Latin American
evidence, World Development, vol. 30, No. 8, Amsterdam,
Elsevier Science, August.
_______ (2003a): La crisis del Programa de Pensiones en la Caja
de Seguro Social de Panamá, Panama City, Friedrich Ebert
Foundation, 5 February.
_______ (2003b): Panorama de los sistemas de pensiones en Ibero-
américa (Alicante, II Conferencia Iberoamericana de Ministros
Responsables de la Seguridad Social, 2-3 October).
_______ (2004a): Las reformas de pensiones en América Latina y su
impacto en los principios de la seguridad social, “Financiamiento
del desarrollo” series, No. 144, LC/L.2090-P, Santiago, Chile,
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
(ECLAC).
_______ (2004b): La reforma de pensiones en América Latina:
modelos, características, mitos, desempeños y lecciones, in K.
Hujo, C. Mesa-Lago and M. Nitsch (comps.), ¿Públicos o
privados? Los sistemas de pensiones en América Latina
después de dos décadas, Caracas, Nueva Sociedad.
_______ (2004c): La seguridad social en Cuba en el período especial:
diagnóstico y sugerencias de políticas en pensiones, salud y
empleo, in L. Witte (comp.), Seguridad social en Cuba:
diagnóstico, retos y perspectivas, Caracas, Nueva Sociedad.
_______ (2004e): El reto de la universalidad en la cobertura de
pensiones de seguridad social en Iberoamérica, paper
presented at the International Seminar “50 años de seguridad
social en Iberoamérica” (Salvador de Bahía, 25 March).
Mesa-Lago, C. and F. Bertranou (1998): Manual de economía de la
seguridad social latinoamericana, Montevideo, Centro
Latinoamericano de Economía Humana (CLAEH).
Mesa-Lago, C. and E. M. Hohnerlein (2002): Testing the
assumptions on the effects of the German pension reform
based on Latin American and Eastern European outcomes,
European Journal of Social Security, vol. 4, No. 4, The Hague,
Kluwer Law International, October-December.
Mesa-Lago, C. and K. Müller (2004): La política de las reformas
de pensiones en América Latina, in K. Hujo, C. Mesa-Lago
and M.. Nitsch (comps.), ¿Públicos o privados? Los sistemas
de pensiones en América Latina después de dos décadas,
Caracas, Nueva Sociedad.
MTESS (Ministerio de Trabajo, Empleo y Seguridad Social) (2003):
Libro blanco de la previsión social, Buenos Aires, Secretaría
de Previsión Social.
Müller, K. (2002): Privatising Old-age Security: Latin America and
Eastern Europe Compared, Bonn, IDE.
Osage, P. and J. Stiglitz (2001): Rethinking pension reform: ten
myths about social security systems, in R. Holzmann and
others (comps.), New Ideas About Old Age Security: Towards
Sustainable Pension Systems in the 21st Century, Washington,
D.C., World Bank.
SAFJP (Superintendencia de Administradoras de Fondos de
Jubilaciones y Pensiones) (2002): Propuesta de fortalecimiento
del Sistema Integrado de Jubilaciones y Pensiones, Buenos
Aires.
_______ (2003a): Boletín estadístico mensual, vol. 9, Buenos Aires,
January, http://www.safjp.gov.ar.
_______ (2003b), Boletín estadístico mensual, vol. 10, Buenos Aires,
June, http://www.safjp.gov.ar.
SAFP (Superintendencia de Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones)
(1981-2003): Boletín estadístico, Santiago, Chile.
_______ (2002a): Boletín estadístico, Santiago, Chile.
_______ (2002b): El sistema chileno de pensiones, fifth edition,
Santiago, Chile.
SBC (Superintendencia Bancaria de Colombia) (1999-2003): Bogotá,
D.C., http://www.superbancaria. gov.co.
SBS (Superintendencia de Banca y Seguros) (2002): Lima, December,
http://www.safp.gob.pe.
_______ (2003): Lima, June, http://www.safp.gob.pe.
Schwarzer, H. (2004): La nueva reforma previsional en Brasil, in
K. Hujo, C. Mesa-Lago and M. Nitsch (comps.), ¿Públicos o
privados? Los sistemas de pensiones en América Latina
después de dos décadas, Caracas, Nueva Sociedad.
SP (Superintendencia de Pensiones) (2002a): San José, Costa Rica,
December, http://www.supen.fi.er.
C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 4  •   D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 4
AN APPRAISAL OF A QUARTER-CENTURY OF STRUCTURAL PENSION REFORMS IN LATIN AMERICA • CARMELO MESA-LAGO
81
_______ (2002b): Revista de estadísticas previsionales, San Salvador,
August, http://www.spensiones.gob.sv.
_______ (2003): San José, March, http://www.supen.fi.cr.
SPVS (Superintendencia de Pensiones, Valores y Seguros) (2002):
Boletín informativo de pensiones, No. 23, La Paz, Bolivia,
December, http://www.spvs.gov.bo.
_______ (2003): Boletín informativo de pensiones, No. 25, La Paz,
June, http://www.spvs.gov.bo.
SSS (Superintendencia de Seguridad Social) (2002): Estadísticas de
seguridad social 2001, Santiago, Chile, Departamento
Actuarial.
Uthoff, A. (2002): Labour markets and pension systems, CEPAL
Review, No. 78, LC/G.2187-P, Santiago, Chile, December.
World Bank (1994): Averting the old age crisis, New York, Oxford
University Press.
